Where is taffy 3

One of three units left, the Americans at first believed the Japanese ships were the ships retreating from the 7th fleet, who's muzzle flashes and thunderclaps of 14 and 16 in guns could be seen and heard over the southern horizon. However, when the shooting started, it became clear that not only were the enemy hostile, they were in range.

Admiral Sprague ordered his fleet to put up a smoke screen and perform evasive actions, they wouldn't make the fight easy for the enemy. Knowing the only weapon they had that could actually cause harm to the Japanese were their torpedoes, Evens elected to close the range. And, somehow avoiding the Japanese shellfire, reached the Enemy fleet and fired off her torpedoes, blowing the bow off the Cruiser Kamuno, and narrowly missing the Kongo.

Inspired by this action, the rest of Taffy 3's Destroyers entered battle, firing torpedoes and engaging in gun battles with ships multiple times their size while the Aircraft, reinforced with aircraft from Taffy 1 and 2, caused what mayhem they could, while the Battleships of 7th fleet slowly sailed north to try and help. Finally, with his ships crippled and on fire, Kurita ordered a retreat. The Battle was won, but not without loss. Gambier Bay, an Escort Carrier, was sunk by surface fire. Her sister ship, St.

Lo, would go down later a few hours later from a Kamikaze strike, one of the first. Roberts, a Destroyer and Destroyer Escort, went down fighting.

And the Johnston, badly mauled, dipped beneath the waves driving Japanese Destroyers off the Carriers. Among the brave sailors who went down with her was Commander Evens. We will do what damage we can. This memorial, detailing the names and awards of the American ships, squadrons, and sailors and containing a bust of Admiral Sprague, was dedicated in to cement the Units place in history. Accessed June 30th Battle off Samar, Destroyer History Foundation. Girminsky, Robert A.

A Brief History of U. Navy Official Website. Significantly, a chance White Plains hit on Chokai caused enough damage aboard the latter for her to fall out of formation and later fall prey to aircraft from Kitkun Bay.

More smoke was laid, but given the course and wind direction, this did little to hide the carriers. However, Gambier Bay , on the exposed port flank of the formation, began receiving Japanese hits—including from Kongo —at , which started fires on her flight and hangar decks.

She then received hits below the waterline in her forward port engine room, which flooded. Johnston attempted to draw fire away from Gambier Bay , but the Japanese concentrated on the carrier. Gambier Bay was dead in the water and sinking by and ordered abandoned ten minutes later. Note Japanese cruiser, barely visible on the horizon at the right G As the task unit proceeded toward the southwest, Samuel B.

Roberts, Heerman , and Johnston continued to engage the pursuing Japanese heavy cruisers. Shortly before Hoel sank, Sprague ordered John C. At this point, with the exception of John C.

Butler , the escorts had expended all of their torpedoes. Given the dispositions of the two forces, it was also questionable if an advantageous firing position was even still possible. The destroyers and destroyer escorts had to resort to darting attacks at the Japanese cruisers while firing their guns, zig-zagging back and forth between the carriers and the enemy.

Around , Samuel B. Roberts received her first serious hit, which entered her hull under the waterline and knocked out her No. More Japanese hits followed. All power and communications were lost, and Samuel B. Roberts was abandoned at Her commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander Robert W. At , just before Samuel B. However, Johnston, limping on one engine, was hit several times more as the Japanese destroyers concentrated their fire on her.

Her other engine knocked out, her topsides in shambles, with no power or communications, Johnston was dead in the water at and was ordered abandoned five minutes later. Evans, did not survive her sinking, but was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously. A Japanese heavy cruiser dead in the water possibly Chikuma , with a destroyer standing by, during the Battle off Samar, 25 October Note the extensive oil slick around the sinking cruiser G Explosion aboard USS St.

Earlier that morning, just after the Japanese force had been sighted by Taffy 3, Stump had his available TBM Avengers re-armed with torpedoes or pound bombs capable of damaging capital ships.

Rather than targeting specific vessels, Stump ordered his air group to attempt to cripple as many Japanese ships as possible. Taffy 2 and Taffy 3 aircraft contributed to the sinking of the heavy cruisers Chokai, Chikuma , and Suzuya, all of which had received some degree of damage from surface action. After his last remaining scout aircraft was shot down shortly after , and unaware of the proximity of his weakened and outnumbered opponent, Kurita decided to break off the surface action.

Center Force, still under air attack, began to retrace its course toward the northwest. Other Taffy 1 escort carriers experienced near misses. The kamikaze attacks—an as-yet-unfamiliar enemy tactic— halted or slowed flight operations until after Land-based kamikaze aircraft attacked Taffy 3 just before However, one Japanese plane, already damaged by White Plains antiaircraft fire, dove into St.

Lo sank in less than 30 minutes after the attack. Follow-on kamikaze targeted the other carriers. Her after stack was also hit. By , the Japanese air attacks ceased and the task unit was able to concentrate on assessing damage and searching for survivors from Hoel, Gambier Bay, Samuel B.

Roberts , Johnston , and St. The initiative, aggressiveness, and outright heroism demonstrated by Taffy 3, combined with determined U. Field, James A. Draws extensively on U. Strategic Bombing Survey interviews of senior Japanese naval commanders in the immediate post-war period and on other primary-source materials. Morison, Samuel Eliot. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, Vego, Milan. She charged onward to close the enemy—first a line of seven destroyers; next, one light and three heavy cruisers; and then the four battleships.

To the east appeared three other cruisers and several destroyers. As soon as range closed, Johnston opened her 5-inch battery on the nearest cruiser, scoring damaging hits. Robert C. Then Comdr. When she came out of the smoke a minute later, Japanese cruiser Kumano could be seen burning furiously from torpedo hits.

Kumano later sank. The hits resulted in the loss of all power to the steering engine, all power to the three 5-inch guns in the after part of the ship, and rendered our gyro compass useless. At a. But Johnston had already expended torpedoes. That meant one engine for Johnston who could hardly do more than slow down. Now there was so much smoke that Evans ordered no firing unless the gunnery officer could see the ship. In 40 seconds we got off 30 rounds, at least 15 of which hit the pagoda superstructure.

The BB belched a few inchers at us, but, thank God, registered only clean misses. Johnston outfought the entire Japanese destroyer squadron, concentrating on the lead ship until the enemy quit cold; then concentrated on the second destroyer until the remaining enemy units broke off to get out of effective gun range before launching torpedoes, all of which went wild.

Johnston took a hit which knocked out one forward gun, damaged another, and her bridge was rendered untenable by fires and explosions resulting from a hit in her 40mm ready ammunition locker. More shells! They made a sort of running semicircle around our ship, shooting at us like a bunch of Indians attacking a prairie schooner. Our lone engine and fire room was knocked out; we lost all power, and even the indomitable skipper knew we were finished.

At Johnston rolled over and began to sink. A Japanese destroyer came up to 1, yards and pumped a final shot into her to make sure she went down. A survivor saw the Japanese captain salute her as she went down.

That was the end of Johnston.